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Abstract—Climate change enforces the integration of dis-
tributed renewable energy sources and development of carbon
price scheme. Whilst the energy is traded among distributed
prosumers, the carbon responsibilities and corresponding al-
lowances trading need to be transferred from large-scale energy
suppliers to prosumers. During this transformation, the issues of
energy imbalance, carbon reduction imbalance, and residential
privacy leakage in centralised trading market present serious
challenges. In this paper, we propose a fully decentralised
blockchain-based peer-to-peer trading scheme coupling energy
and carbon markets. We implement pay-to-public-key-hash with
multiple signatures as a transaction standard to realise a more
secure transaction and reduced storage burden of senders. A
script is hashed during the wallet address generation for each
new transaction to protect residential privacy. A novel carbon
accounting method and corresponding incentive mechanism for
carbon reduction are designed to evaluate emission behaviours
of distributed prosumers. Case studies demonstrate that the
proposed scheme leads a reduced costs and carbon emissions
compared to centralised trading systems and existing blockchain-
based trading schemes.
Index Terms—blockchain, decentralized energy trading, low
carbon, distributed energy sources, smart grids.
NOMENCLATURE
αn Monetary compensation rate.
δk Random number for generating I2.
pig , piu Offer of energy seller g (or carbon seller u).
pik, piv Bid of energy buyer k (or carbon buyer v).
A Address of prosumers.
Cn Carbon allowances of prosumer n.
ei CEF intensity of branch i.
ek CEF intensity of prosumer k’s consumption.
Ek,Eg Intended energy demand (or supply) of energy buyer
k (or seller g).
el CEF intensity of loss in branch l.
en,s CEF intensity from generation source s of prosumer
n.
I1, I2 Encrypted key pairs.
Mn Monetary compensation of prosumer n for selling
carbon allowances.
Pi,j Share of power flow in branch j from branch i.
Pk Consumption of prosumer k.
Pl Transmission loss of branch l.
Pn,s Active power output from generation source s of
prosumer n.
Pn power generation of prosumer n.
Rj CEF rate of branch j.
Rn Net CEF rate of prosumer n.
Rscript Redemption script.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation and Background
In the conventional energy sector, around 80% of power
demand is supplied by centralized fossil fuel-based power
plants including coal, gas, and oil [1]. Enormous carbon
emissions are produced by high carbon intensity of combusting
fossil fuels and additional energy losses during long-distance
transmission, which leads to air pollution and irreversible
effects of climate change. Facing these environmental issues,
policy makers, on one hand, facilitate distributed renewable
energy sources (DRESs) to be integrated into distribution
systems for carbon mitigation and transmission efficiency. On
the other hand, they formulate carbon pricing scheme as a
market-based climate policy to charge carbon producers for
allowances, so as to phase out the power plants with extreme
high carbon intensities [2].
To help the integration of DRESs, 200 million smart meters
will be invested in E.U. by 2020 [3], which facilitates in-
creasing number of consumers to produce or store electricity
at home through solar panels [4], electric vehicles [5], and
batteries [6]. The role of prosumers is formed when consumers
actively manage their own electricity generation and con-
sumption [7] relying on smart meters and these technologies.
Involving prosumers to the distribution networks contributes
to sustainability and efficiency of electricity system as well
as benefits of consumers. Nonetheless, in existing centralized
wholesale markets, energy and carbon allowances are traded
among large scale power plants with precisely estimated de-
mand and centralised wholesale price. This unique wholesale
price is not suitable for small and independent prosumers,
because it would result in either energy imbalance caused
by localized generation uncertainties or emissions reduction
imbalance caused by various consumption patterns. Besides,
central authorities require to access the trading and consump-
tion information for management, which may draw concerns
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for residential privacy leakage. Hence, decentralised market
structures and tariffs need to be reformulated to securely
support the involvement of prosumers.
B. Relevant Literature
With respect to carbon price scheme, emission trading
scheme or cap-and-trade scheme are typical approaches to
establish carbon markets in a majority of countries [8], which
forces emission producers to buy emission allowances they
estimate to emit. Although this policy successfully realises
a coal-to-gas transition, several issues have been brought by
an inappropriate centralised carbon price due to surplus or
scarcity of carbon allowances, notably for the involvement
of prosumers. If the centralised carbon price lies below the
estimates of social cost of carbon in a specific region, it
fails to involve more DRESs to replace fossil fuel-based
generators; If the centralised carbon price is set too high,
the business competitiveness of large scale prosumers will be
harmed. To tackle the inappropriate centralised carbon price
issue, previous centralised auction method was extended to
consumer-centric adjustment through revaluating consumers’
actual carbon intensity in [9], but the auction of carbon markets
was still based on a central authority such as market operator.
Therefore, there are still opportunities for reforming carbon
emission trading to accommodate decentralised energy trading.
A decentralised carbon market is therefore desired, under
which the localized carbon price is more suitable for incen-
tivizing carbon mitigation considering specific prosumption
pattern.
Blockchain technology, as a peer-to-peer distributed ledger,
has the potential to establish a decentralised emission trading
scheme for coupling prosumers’ energy trading and protect
residential privacy. For energy trading, Di Silvestre et al.
[10] proposed a permissioned blockchain applying in the
microgrids, by which functions of validation and organisation
were performed by distribution system operators. Analogously,
Kang et al. [11] designed a blockchain based peer-to-peer
energy trading among electric vehicles performed by local
aggregators. Although the relatively decentralised agents were
included, the leakage of residential privacy and tampering
by these agents were still unavoidable. For carbon allowance
trading, Khaqqi et al. [12] customised it to industries using
reputation system based blockchain technologies for encourag-
ing low carbon behaviours. Although it contributed to carbon
reduction and low-carbon investment, the market competitive
might be harmed due to the domination by participants with
high reputation. Instead of focusing on a blockchain-based
energy market or carbon market separately in existing studies,
coupling both markets is a novel option to provide an efficient
and reliable trading scheme since the carbon market is directly
related to the operating cost of prosumers and has the same
settlement period with energy market.
With the involvement of DRESs, the responsibility of carbon
mitigation is transferred accordingly from previous fossil fuel-
based power plants to distributed prosumers. Carbon account-
ing in prosumer level becomes necessary. The carbon emis-
sion flow (CEF) was introduced for consumers’ side carbon
accounting in [13], [14]. However, the new system structure
affected by local peer-to-peer energy exchange amplifies car-
bon tracing complexity. Existing carbon accounting methods
may degrade when distinguishing which portion of emissions
is caused by prosumers’ own power consumption and which
portion of emissions is caused by selling surplus power.
C. Contributions and Organization
This paper approaches a novel peer-to-peer energy and
carbon trading in energy sector and has contributions as:
• We propose a decentralised peer-to-peer energy and car-
bon trading scheme to accommodate the integration of
DRESs. Compared with existing centralized wholesale
market and relatively decentralised blockchain-based ap-
proaches, our proposed fully decentralised blockchain
scheme can reflect the localized power imbalance and
carbon emission caused by consumption patterns.
• We design a monetary incentive mechanism for carbon
reduction to realise tax neutralizing without market inter-
ventions in biding process.
• Current carbon accounting methods are extended to in-
volve the role of prosumers in distribution network. A
more fair allocation of responsibilities and incentives for
carbon mitigation is proposed.
• Case studies demonstrate that a trading scheme with more
secure transaction and residential privacy is established.
The halved cost and CEF can be realised compared to
conventional centralised trading system.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
This section describes the overall framework of peer-to-peer
energy and carbon trading. The blockchain technique selection
and carbon emission trading mechanism are discussed.
A. Peer-to-Peer Energy and Carbon Trading Framework
Fig. 1. Framework of blockchain-based peer-to-peer trading.
Fig. 1 presents framework of blockchain-based peer-to-peer
energy and carbon trading. Prosumers directly interconnect
with each other under peer-to-peer model to buy and sell
services of energy and carbon allowances as shown in part
a. Encrypted trading information including transactional data
of energy and carbon allowances, incentive information for
carbon reduction, pseudonyms of prosumers’ ID, consumption
data, digital asset records, and timestamps of transactions are
stored, shared, and audited by all nodes in blockchain to
validate authenticity and accuracy. During each transaction as
shown in part b, the ownership of tokens is changed after
signing and broadcasting the encrypted trading information to
the network. Transactions are structured in publicly available
blocks and chronologically chained to each other through
involving the hash of previous block into the current block,
forming a blockchain as shown in part c. All blocks are
protected by solving a proof-of-work via secure hash algorithm
SHA256 [15]. The inputs of proof-of-work are block ID,
nonce (number once), timestamp, and hash output of previous
block, and the output of proof-of-work is fixed-length digest
as unique identity. This unique identity is guaranteed by
specially mined nonce, which means that if one block is
changed, a different nonce results in an unverified block,
and if all following blocks are changed, it will be extremely
computationally difficult. Therefore, the chaining feature and
difficulty of solving a proof-of-work enable transactions to
be traceable, verifiable and tempering resistance. Additionally,
token senders’ private key is used to sign a transfer to an
address generated by receivers’ public key. The validation of
this transaction is collectively voted by all nodes. This not only
protects prosumers’ residential privacy, but avoids the double
spending attacks.
B. Blockchain Model Selection
1) Transaction Standard: In order to guarantee that all
the nodes recognise the transactions, it is necessary to use
specified script for standardizing the transaction information
over blockchain. This specified script includes pay-to-public-
key-hash (P2PKH), pay-to-public-key (P2PK), multiple sig-
natures (MS), pay-to-script-hash (P2SH) [16]. During the
process of transaction, token sender creates a script to specify
the amount of transferred token (i.e. UTXO) and receiver’s
address. Meanwhile, receiver creates a script to specify its
own signature. Subsequently, this transaction is broadcast to
the overall network and the scripts of sender and receiver are
matched by other nodes to verify the authenticity.
Under the transaction standard of P2PKH, the token sender’s
script is created by token receiver’s public key as address (i.e.
scriptPubKey) and the token receiver’s script is created by
its private key as identified signature (i.e. scriptSig). Unlike
P2PKH, under the P2SH, the sender’s scriptPubKey is sub-
stituted by receiver’s redeem script which defines conditions
under which a transaction is redeemed [16]. When receiver’s
hash matches the hash created by its redeem script and the
signature belongs to receiver itself, the identity of receiver
is verified. This enables the transaction to be more securely
performed because token receiver cares more about where the
token goes than sender. Without creating script, the storage
burden of token sender also decreases. In addition, to protect
the decentralised trading system from theft, other nodes within
blockchain are involved as an arbitrator to sign a transaction
before it is validated. This process is defined as MS, in which
minimum p signatures must match q provided public keys,
before the token is spent. Compared with original MS using
the whole script, P2SH uses Base58 to encode the script such
that the complexity of original script is reduced. Therefore, in
our proposed energy and carbon trading scheme, the P2SH is
used as a transaction standard due to aforementioned advan-
tages compared with other standards.
2) Address Generation: During the process of energy and
carbon trading, a key-pair including private key and public
key is important for authenticity of transaction. Private key
is used to generate public key, before public key is used to
generate public key hash (i.e. address) through SHA256. This
generation process is irreversible, which means that with a
given public key or address, the private key cannot be inferred.
The process of generating address from private key can be
expressed as following steps:
Step 1: A private key is randomly generated, before creating
public key through secp256k1 of elliptic curve digital signature
algorithm asymmetric cryptography [17].
Step 2: Under P2SH, instead of hashing the public key, a
script hash is generated through hashing the redemption script
using SHA256 and then RIPEMD160 [18].
Step 3: To guarantee the address is valid without any typo-
graphical error, a checksum is generated through truncating the
result of double SHA256 to the first four bytes. Both version
number and checksum are concatenated to the script hash
through encoded by Base58. Therefore, an encrypted wallet
address is generated.
C. Carbon Emission Trading Mechanism
1) Carbon Emission Tracing for Prosumers: In distribution
systems, prosumers play as the role of both generators and
consumers. An initiative carbon tracing method should be
therefore designed to distinguish emissions caused by meeting
prosumers’ own demand, supplying other prosumers’ demand,
and demand being supplied by other prosumers. A virtual
concept of CEF proposed by [14] is used to trace the carbon
footprint. Compared to the original CEF which focuses on the
overall power systems from generators to consumers, we ex-
tend this method to investigate the CEF caused by prosumers’
behaviours. The CEF represents a concurrent virtual network
flow with power flow, which is ejected from power outflow
buses, and transmitted to power inflow buses through trans-
mission networks. By abstracting network features of power
systems, the carbon emission shares caused by transmission
and consumption are evaluated.
Consider a peer-to-peer power networks with N prosumers,
indexed by integer n. Each prosumer possesses a single or
various generation sources, such as solar, and wind. For a
prosumer with a single generation source, its CEF intensity
is determined by emission factor of this source which is
evaluated by life-cycle carbon assessment [19]. For a multi-
source prosumer with S sources, indexed by integer s, the
CEF intensity is determined by all the sources as
en =
S∑
s=1
(Pn,s · en,s)
/
S∑
s=1
Pn,s , (1)
where Pn,s is active power output from sth generation source
of nth prosumer, and en,s is CEF intensity in a unit of
tCO2/MWh. When a prosumer generates power, it ejects
power and corresponding CEF into branches. Analogously
with power flow, the CEF is mixed in branches according to
proportional sharing principle [20]. The branch receives CEF
from outflow buses in a given proportion, and distributes this
CEF to inflow buses in the same proportion, so that the share
of outflow CEF in a branch, and the share of branch CEF in
a inflow bus can be evaluated. Denote i and j as inflow and
outflow branches of bus z, respectively. The CEF rate in jth
branch can be expressed as the sum of CEF rates in inflow set
of branches and bus-connected generation
Rj =
∑
i∈z
(Pi,jei) +
∑
n∈z
(Pnen), (2)
where Rj is the CEF rate of jth branch in a unit of tCO2/h, ei
is CEF intensity of ith branch, and Pi,j is the share of power
flow in jth branch from ith branch. According to proportional
sharing principle,Pi,jPj =
Pi
/(∑
i∈z Pi +
∑
n∈z Pn
) . Hence
ej =
Rj
Pj
=
∑
i∈z(Pi · ei) +
∑
n∈z(Pn · en)∑
i∈z Pi +
∑
n∈z Pn
. (3)
Since the CEF of a branch loss is equivalent to a load
on this branch, it has the same expression of inflow CEF of
consumption. (3) can be also applied to the CEF intensity of
branch loss el and consumption ek for lth branch loss and
kth prosumer’s consumption, respectively. Therefore, the net
CEF of prosumers is the difference between CEF caused by
generation, consumption and transmission loss
Rn = Pn · en − Pl · el − Pk · ek, (4)
where Rn is net CEF of prosumer n, and Pn, Pl and Pk are
power generation, transmission loss, and consumption.
2) Emission Reduction Incentive Mechanism: In the
reputation-based blockchain trading system [12], the emission
reduction behaviour is quantified as priority value to categorize
sellers’ offers into different groups as buyers’ access condition.
Although this strategy can stimulate the carbon reduction, the
priority value may harm the market discipline due to market
intervention. Unlike this reputation-based trading system, our
proposed incentive mechanism designs a monetary compen-
sation strategy for carbon reduction to simplify the priority
selection procedure during emission trading and guarantee the
market discipline. This monetary compensation for each peer
is generated by the decentralised trading system to distribute
the received revenue from carbon allowances trading. If the
CEF rate of prosumers is equal to the carbon allowances in
a time slot, prosumers will not receive any compensation. By
contrast, if the CEF rate of prosumers is less than the carbon
allowances, prosumers will receive monetary compensation
from systems. Additionally, the monetary compensation at
high CEF rate level is higher than that at lower CEF rate
level. This relationship can be described as
Mn =
{
αn[(Cn)
2 − (Rn)2], Cn > Rn;
0, Cn = Rn,
(5)
where Mn is the received monetary compensation of pro-
sumer, αn is the monetary compensation rate, Cn is carbon
allowances of prosumer, and Rn is the CEF rate of prosumer.
III. ENERGY AND CARBON MARKETS COUPLING THEORY
This section describes trading procedure for peer-to-peer
energy and carbon markets. Different from trading mechanism
in conventional markets which requires a central authority to
match bids and offers and publish unique market cleaning
prices, the decentralized feature of blockchain is involved in
the peer-to-peer trading. A prosumer is able to flexibly choose
an offer. Moreover, compared to single energy trading, the
coupled emission trading enables the incentive mechanism to
be applied in the trading process for carbon mitigation in
consumption side. Assume a peer-to-peer trading system for
current transactions and let G,K,U, V to denote the size of
energy sellers, energy buyers, carbon allowances sellers, and
carbon allowances buyers, indexed by g, k, u, v, respectively,
g, k, u, v ∈ N .
Step 1: Generate addresses of energy seller Ag , energy buyer
Ak, carbon allowances seller Au, and carbon allowances buyer
Av for each new transaction to provide an entry of trading.
Step 2: Energy buyer k announces intended energy de-
mand Ek and its bid pik as well as address Ak to
blockchain network for verification of enough tokens. The
overall demand of network is correspondingly increased by∑K
k=1Ek. The encrypted information key pairs for broad-
casting are Ik,1=hash{Rscriptk‖Ek‖pik‖timestamp} and
Ik,2=hash{Ik,1‖δk}, where Ik,1 is a static key to verify the
ownership of pik tokens, Rscriptk is a redemption script of
buyer k, and δk is a random number for generating Ik,2.
Step 3: System servers perform power flow tracing, CEF
tracing, and reduction incentive calculation. The required
carbon allowances Cn and amount of monetary compensation
Mn are quantified and transmitted to specific prosumer n.
Step 4: Carbon allowances buyer v announces required
allowances Cv and their bids piv to blockchain network.
Encrypted information key pairs are Iv,1=hash{Rscriptk
‖Cv‖piv‖timestamp} and Iv,2=hash{Iv,1‖δv}.
Step 5: Energy and carbon allowances sellers announce
intended supplies Eg and Cu, respectively, and corre-
sponding offers pig and piu as well as addresses to
blockchain network for verification through encrypted infor-
mation key pairs: Ig,1=hash{Rscriptg‖Eg‖pig‖timestamp}
(or Iu,1=hash{Rscriptu‖Cu‖piu‖timestamp} ) and Ig,2 =
hash{Ig,1‖δg}(or Iu,2 = hash{Iu,1‖δu}). Ik,2, Iv,2, Ig,2, and
Ig,2 can be taken as locks and only be unlocked by senders and
receivers’ identities. Hence, either double spending of token or
double spending of energy and carbon allowances is prevented.
Step 6: System servers update database of the offers pi′u
and bids pi′v of carbon allowances by adding the monetary
compensation to sellers’ original offers and buyers’ original
bids as pi′u = piu +Mu and pi
′
v = piv −Mv , before sorting
them in sequence and publishing to the auction board.
Step 7: Buyers receive a list of filtered offers and corre-
sponding addresses relevant to their queries by conditions:
Eg ≥ Ek (or Cu ≥ Cv), and select potential suppliers.
Step 8: Each of potential suppliers opens a transmission
channel and feeds energy into peer-to-peer network, before
generating multi-signature redemption scripts to note the
amount and receivers. Receiving the redemption scripts, buy-
ers hash them and specify purchasing tokens. These multi-
signature transactions are broadcast to all nodes of networks
for signing. If the signature script matches P2SH address, the
transaction are validated by networks to transfer the ownership.
IV. CASE STUDIES
Case studies have been conducted to demonstrate the per-
formance of the proposed trading scheme. Proposed scheme is
applied in adjusted IEEE 14-bus test system which consists of
7 prosumers with DRESs including 4 solar, 2 wind, 1 biomass,
and 4 vehicle-to-grid. The power generation and consumption
of these DRESs is simulated from our previous research [21].
A. Evaluation of Decentralised Trading Scheme
TABLE I
MULTI-CRITERIA EVALUATION
Cost [£] Net CEF [kg] Transmission Loss [kW]
Centralised 331.63 104.84 302.78
Decentralised 142.98 42.23 298.13
To compare the proposed fully decentralised peer-to-peer
energy and carbon trading scheme with conventional cen-
tralised trading, a performance evaluation is performed to
assess environmental, economic, and security benefits. The
performance evaluation between centralised and decentralised
trading is presented in TABLE. I. The generating costs of
each of sources are evaluated by multiplying the cost co-
efficients as [21] with power generation. The net CEF is
evaluated according to (4). The transmission loss is obtained
by performing power flow analysis. It can be seen that the
decentralised trading system realises an improvement in all
dimensions, notably for cost and carbon emissions reduction.
Although in peer-to-peer trading system, the power flow is
not optimized as conventional power systems, the transmis-
sion loss is still reduced because peers prefer to trade with
neighbourhood considering transmission costs. Regarding the
CEF tracing, according to (4), the negative net CEF means
the CEF caused by generation is less than CEF caused by
consumption and transmission. The initial carbon allowances
are distributed according to carbon intensities of prosumers.
When their prosumption behaviours cause positive net CEF,
they will purchase for carbon allowances for next half hour.
The distributions of generation CEF (a), transmission CEF (b),
consumption CEF (c), net CEF (d), carbon allowances (e),
and compensation (f) for 11 prosumers in half-hour interval
are presented in Fig. 2. Each column denotes the distribution
of CEF and monetary compensation in peer-to-peer networks.
The dark blue colour represents a lower value whereas the
bright yellow colour represents a higher value. As shown in
Fig. 2, the localized CEF caused by prosumption behaviours
in blockchain network is reflected, such that a fair allocation
of monetary compensation can be formulated.
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Fig. 2. The distributions of generation CEF (a), transmission CEF (b),
consumption CEF (c), net CEF (d), carbon allowances (e), and compensation
(f) for 11 prosumers.The x-axis denotes each half-hour settlement period and
y-axis denotes the number of peers or branches.
With respect to security and residential privacy, the en-
crypted residential addresses guarantee that only the trading
type and amount can be traced and reviewed by networks. The
P2SH transaction standard with multi-signature can effectively
prevent double spending of tokens, carbon allowances, and
energy. Thus, a more secure trading platform compared to
centralised trading system is established.
B. Peer-to-Peer Trading
The information of encrypted trading addresses, trading
type, and trading amount is stored in data cell of each trans-
action. Available bids and offers involving proposed monetary
incentive mechanism for the second settlement period are
presented in TABLE II as an example. These bids and offers
of each transaction are published in trading platform for
participants’ selection. Only those who produce positive net
CEF are able to participant the carbon allowances trading
because their prosumption behaviours are the direct source
of carbon emissions. It can be seen that although carbon
allowances seller 10 provides larger amount of allowance
surplus than seller 7, it still has a lower offer price due
to a higher monetary compensation. The trading and block
generation procedures are shown in TABLE III. The first 2
blocks are selected as an example, in which the first block
is a genesis block without trading information. The buyers
match sellers based on the lowest price principle. For instance,
carbon allowances buyer 10’s options include 0.0302 £/kg
TABLE II
EXAMPLE OF AVAILABLE BIDS AND OFFERS FOR ONE SETTLEMENT PERIOD
Carbon Allowances Buyers Carbon Allowances Sellers Energy Buyers Energy Sellers
# Amount [g] Bid [£/kg] # Amount [g] Offer [£/kg] # Amount [Wh] Bid [£/kWh] # Amount [Wh] Offer [£/kWh]
4 216 0.0308 7 173 0.0311 1 356 0.122 4 3617 0.108
11 16 0.0322 10 239 0.0302 2 16461 0.125 7 4432 0.133
3 13272 0.123 8 48071 0.121
5 14164 0.109 10 9449 0.126
6 6687 0.123
9 4615 0.131
11 17508 0.110
(purchase all 216 g from seller 10), 0.0309 £/kg (purchase
173 g from seller 7 and other 43 kg from seller 10). Hence,
buyer 10 will choose the first option. Therefore, unlike the
reputation based trading system, all the offers and bids are
available for participants and the incentive is included without
market intervention.
TABLE III
BLOCKCHAIN STRUCTURE FOR PEER-TO-PEER TRADING
Timestamp: t1; Block index: 0; nonce: []
Data: Genesis Block
SelfHash: ’075c27741a3506846368fa6e5b3477f85b31ceee71a5716e2’
Timestamp: t2;Block index: 1;nonce: 224
Data:{Sender: ’7b2891454769d57605dcfceaa9967121’
Receiver: ’c9c940aec3ad22d7527863ecfc4cfc7c’
Type: ’Carbon Allowances’; Amount: 216 }
PreviousHash: ’075c27741a3506846368fa6e5b3477f85b31ceee71a5716e2’
SelfHash: ’00c8091e1a5055e933f8498c6095ad44’
V. CONCLUSION
To solve the inappropriate market cleaning price and carbon
reduction imbalance caused by integration of DRESs, and
guarantee trading platform security and residential privacy, a
blockchain-based peer-to-peer trading scheme coupling energy
and carbon markets is proposed. The underlying idea is using
a proposed carbon accounting method to evaluate emission
behaviours of prosumers and formulate an monetary com-
pensation mechanism to incentivise carbon reduction, such
that the localised energy and carbon emissions of DRESs
can be involved through decentralised feature of blockchain
networks. The decentralised trading scheme promotes more
reductions of costs and carbon emissions than centralised
systems. The P2SH with multi-signature prevents the double-
spending attacks and guarantees residential privacy. In future
work, the effects of proposed trading scheme on long-term
investment of low carbon technologies should be investigated.
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